Principled Parentage: Abandoning the Gender-Based Underpinnings of Legal
Parentage Analysis as Applied in the Context of Gestational Surrogacy

INTRODUCTION
Who is a legal parent to a child conceived by nontraditional means? Who is not a
legal parent, despite some parental tieto the child? The protections given to parents in
raising their children are of constitutional dimension.1 However, as new technologies
offer new ways to create a child, the courts continue to struggle with basic questions of
parentage.2 And application of existing family law to these new scenarios does not
always yield the correct result, because traditional gender-based constructions of the
natural family obscure the underlying inquiry of whether each party has a valid claim to
parentage.
In K.M. v. E.G.,3 the California courts struggled with complex parentage
questions in the context of a lesbian family.4 Mother fought against mother: the woman
who had given birth to a set of twins through gestational surrogacy sought to prevent her
former partner, the woman who had donated the eggs and raised the children for five
years, from gaining parental rights to the children.5 The California Supreme Court
ultimately concluded that both the gestational mother and the genetic mother were legal
parents to the twins.6
The court’s decision in K.M. v. E.G. honored both the genetic tie between parent
and child and the parent-child relationship that had developed between the children and
the non-birth mother. In so holding, the court found it necessary to consider both parents’
gender in evaluating one parent’s claim. The court’s express assumption, that a child
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may have two mothers, is far from universally accepted and could become the basis of a
refusal to grant parental rights in other jurisdictions. Also, the K.M. v. E.G. dissents offer
a number of arguments that other state courts may find persuasive, if the parentage
dialogue focuses on gender. Furthermore, other states’ case law may pose additional
obstacles to a correct parentage finding if the courts’ focus is not on each party’s
individual parentage claim.
This article evaluates the plight of the non-legal parent who has both a genetic and
a relational tie to a child, in light of basic legal and social premises about parenthood.
Part I will provide the legal background of parentage determinations, discussing the
policy considerations and various factual contexts where courts must ultimately grant or
deny legal parenthood status. Part II will present a case study of K.M. v. E.G.,7 including
a presentation of the facts of the case and the reasoning of the majority and of the two
dissents. Part III will consider the fate of the genetic and functional parent in light of the
policies that underlie parentage decisions. More specifically, part III will conclude that a
parent who both is a biological parent and has developed a parent-child relationship with
a genetic child ought to be considered a legal parent. This conclusion ought not to be
vulnerable to attack based on the gender of the other parent; rather, each parent’s claims
should be evaluated independently. Part IV tests the proposition that each parent’s claims
should be evaluated individually and without reference to the other party’s gender. When
gender becomes irrelevant and we abandon the gender-based underpinnings of legal
parentage analysis as applied in gestational surrogacy cases, correct parentage decisions
can be more easily reached when considering families created by non-traditional means.
I.
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BACKGROUND

American family law reflects our collective understanding8 that children belong
with their biological parents whenever possible and that parents should raise their
biological children.9 The United States Supreme Court has “declared it ‘plain beyond the
need for multiple citation that a natural parent’s desire for and right to the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children’ is an interest far
more precious than any property right.”10 All fifty states recognize a presumption that
children are best off with their natural (i.e. biological) parents.11 Courts protect the
parent-child relationship by using one standard to decide custody disputes between
parents12 and another standard to decide custody and visitation disputes between a parent
and a third party.13 Although courts will look at the best interests of the child in resolving
custody disputes between parents,14 a parent will not lose custody to a third party unless
the parent has proven unfit.15 Therefore, even if a child’s interests arguably might be
better served by termination of parental rights, the child will remain with its biological
parents as long as the parents are not neglectful or abusive.16
This preference for a biological tie is evident in several contexts: for example, the
way the law treats unwed fathers. Prior to 1972, a conclusive presumption existed that
any father of a child born out of wedlock was unfit to raise that child.17 In Stanley v.
Illinois, the United States Supreme Court held that, where an unmarried biological father
had raised his own children without neglect, a presumption of unfitness violated the
United States Constitution.18 Rather, the state only can remove a child from its biological
father after proving the father neglectful or abusive.19
The preference for biological parents also is reflected in the structure of adoption
laws. A biological parent may not effectively surrender a child for adoption before that
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child is born, and an adoption consent made within seventy-two hours after birth is
revocable.20 Also, one biological parent may not surrender a child for adoption over the
objection of the other biological parent even if the objecting parent has no existing
relationship with the child.21
Biology is far from determinative, however, in allocating parental rights and
responsibilities.22 A biological parent who does not have a relationship with a child may
not be considered a “legal” parent, and a person who forms a parent-child relationship
may be a legal parent despite the lack of a genetic link.23 A father who later learns he is
not a biological parent, for example, may be estopped from denying paternity of a child
who the father has raised as his own.24 Legal presumptions help the courts to determine
legal parenthood25 and are particularly useful because only one parent, the birth mother,
generally is established at the child’s birth.26 Under the presumption of legitimacy, a
child presumably is the genetic child of the man married to the birth mother, and
therefore the mother’s husband is the child’s legal father.27 In sum, although history and
the law both generally equate biological parenthood with legal parenthood, both the
parent-child relationship and the legal presumptions established by state law are
implicated and can even be determinative, informing the decision of who is, and who is
not, a legal parent.
Advances in reproduction technology and new alternative reproduction options
have further complicated our understanding of who are a child’s legal parents.28
Conception through sperm donation29 is an option both for married women whose
husbands are infertile and for single women who wish to conceive a child without a legal
father. Under the Uniform Parentage Act,30 a man who donates sperm through a licensed
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physician for the purpose of conception will not be a legal parent to a resulting child.31
Conversely, a man who provides sperm directly to a woman for the purpose of
conception, even if conception occurs though artificial insemination with the
participation of a physician, may still be a legal father.32 When a married woman
chooses artificial insemination, the presumption of legitimacy vests parental rights in the
woman’s husband although the husband necessarily lacks any biological tie to the child.33
Only one state’s highest court has considered the case of the man who donates
sperm through a physician with the intent and expectation that the donor will be the
father of a child so conceived.34 In In re R.C., the donor provided sperm to a woman for
artificial insemination.35 By receiving the sperm from a licensed physician, the woman
evidently intended to extinguish the donor’s parental rights.36 The donor, however,
believed that he was to be a legal parent; the donor had donated his sperm only upon the
mother’s promise that he would be a parent and the donor had provided for the child
financially and in other ways.37 The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that, had the parties
actually intended the donor to be the father, then the UPA provision extinguishing the
donor’s rights would not apply and the donor actually would be a legal parent.38
For some couples, surrogacy and gestational surrogacy also are nontraditional
options for having a child. Surrogacy may be appropriate for a couple when the wife is
infertile; the couple solicits a third party, the surrogate, to conceive a child through
artificial insemination and to carry that child to term.39 The surrogate, who also is the
biological mother to the child, then surrenders that child to the biological father.40 A
second type of surrogacy, technically described as a gestational surrogacy, results when
one woman’s eggs are fertilized and implanted in the uterus of another woman (the
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gestational surrogate) and the gestational surrogate carries the child to term.41 A
gestational surrogacy may be appropriate in two different situations: either the biological
mother cannot carry a child of her own and seeks a surrogate to bear that child,42 or the
surrogate cannot conceive with her own eggs yet still desires to give birth to a child of
“her own.”43 Thus the intended mother of a child gestated in this manner may be either
the genetic mother or the gestational mother.
The legality and enforceability of surrogacy contracts varies by state. In In re
Baby M., the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated a surrogacy agreement, likening the
contract to “baby selling.”44 By statute, some states have criminalized surrogacy
agreements, some fail to enforce them and some regulate them carefully.45 The revised
UPA also carefully regulates surrogacy agreements, yet the revised regulations
themselves are premised on the heterosexual model of a male and female as “intended”
parents of a resulting child.46 Regardless of the validity of any surrogacy agreement,
Professor Coleman has identified three types of tests that may be applied to determine
parentage in the surrogacy context: tests based on genetic contribution, tests based on
gestation, and tests based on the parties’ intent.47
Lesbian couples that choose to have a child also often choose conception through
artificial insemination with donated sperm, although gestational surrogacy provides a
second option. 48 The lesbian birth mother, like most birth mothers, will be considered
the natural mother of that child.49 The birth mother’s lesbian partner will not acquire
parental rights through a presumption of legitimacy because lesbian couples cannot, in
most states, legally marry. Therefore, the lesbian partner who neither is a birth mother
nor is a presumptive parent generally has third-party status, rendering the lesbian non-
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biological parent a legal stranger to the child.50 In resolving later custody disputes
between lesbian partners who conceived through sperm donation, the California Supreme
Court found it “tragic” that the non-genetic, non-gestational lesbian parent may have no
parental rights.51 Other courts have struggled to apply various doctrines to protect the
parent-child relationship between a child and a lesbian parent who is not the birth
mother.52
To explain this tragic outcome, scholars have pointed to the “heterosexual legal
regime” that forces alternative families to conform to normative standards set by the
dominant heterosexual group.53 In other words, because many courts make parentage
determinations only through the express assumption that a “natural” family consists of
one man and one woman,54 lesbian families simply may not be “natural” despite the fact
of their existence. Even if not “natural” based on tacit assumptions about natural law,55
however, these individuals still may have valid claims to parentage.
Into the legal quagmire surrounding sperm donors, surrogates, and lesbian
parentage disputes comesK.M. v. E.G. .56 The combination of new reproductive
technologies and social developments make this case possible. Yet none of the rules
developed to address one situation are adequate where several different factual situations
converge.
II.

K.M. v. E.G.57: A CASE STUDY
A.

The Facts

K.M. v. E.G. is a custody dispute between two lesbian partners, both of whom
claim to be legal parents to the children born to EG.58 KM, the petitioner, sought to
establish that she was a legal parent to five-year-old twin girls because she was the girls’
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genetic mother.59 EG, the respondent, moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that EG
was the girls’ sole legal parent.60
KM and EG met in 1992 and became a couple in 1993.61 In 1994, EG and KM
began living together and registered as domestic partners in San Francisco.62 In 1993,
EG both applied for adoption and attempted artificial insemination.63 EG attempted
artificial insemination over a dozen times in 1993 and 1994, and KM joined EG at many
of these appointments.64 In late 1994, EG consulted with a specialist and, at the
specialist’s recommendation, EG asked KM to donate her eggs to EG so that EG might
yet become pregnant.65 KM agreed to supply the eggs that EG needed.66 The couple
selected the sperm donor together and agreed that they would not tell anyone that KM
was the egg donor.67 In early 1995, EG became pregnant with two embryos that had
formed from KM’s eggs.68
Much of the parties’ testimony at trial conflicted. EG had wanted to be a parent
even before she met KM.69 According to EG, she always had intended to become a
single parent and she had made her intent clear to KM.70 EG claimed that she only
accepted KM’s eggs because the couple had agreed that KM “would really be a donor.”71
EG also relied on KM’s signed consent form, whereby KM had waived her rights to her
eggs and any resulting children.72 In contrast, KM claimed that she only agreed to donate
her eggs because the couple had intended to raise a child together.73 Also, KM claimed
that she did not understand the implications of the consent form and did not believe that
she waived any rights by signing it.74
EG gave birth to twins in December, 1995, and the two women told no one that
KM was the egg donor.75 KM acted as the twins’ parent despite this nondisclosure.76
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The couple’s nanny viewed KM as a parent and KM was listed as a parent on the twins’
school forms.77 Also, the twins referred to KM’s parents as their grandparents and to
KM’s siblings as their aunt and uncle.78 In 2001, the couple’s relationship ended and KM
sought legal recognition of her parental status.79
The California trial court dismissed KM’s petition, applying Cailfornia Family
Code § 7613(d).80 Section 7613(d), which expressly applies to sperm donors, states that
a donor is a legal stranger to a child if the donor provided genetic material through a
licensed physician.81 The trial court held that KM’s status was that of a donor, and thus
she was not the twins’ legal parent.82
The California Court of Appeal affirmed.83 The appellate court relied on the test
announced in Johnson v. Calvert, which considered the parties’ intent at conception to be
the “tie-breaker” when two women had competing claims to parentage.84 In Johnson, the
court had awarded legal parentage to the genetic mother, noting that the genetic mother
originally had intended to parent the child and that “for any child California law
recognizes only one natural mother.”85

B.

The California Supreme Court majority opinion: KM is a legal parent.

Overturning the California Court of Appeal, the California Supreme Court86 held
that KM, the twins’ genetic mother, was a legal parent alongside EG, the twins’ birth
mother.87 First, the Court noted that the Uniform Parentage Act defines the parent-child
relationship and, because the rules governing sperm donors did not apply, the Court
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found that both KM and EG were legal parents of the twins.88 Second, the Court found
the intent test in Johnson v. Calvert inapplicable because Johnson was factually
distinguishable, thereby rejecting the appellate court’s reasoning.89
The K.M. Court first looked to the California Family Code and the UPA, noting
that code provisions relevant in evaluating a father-child relationship also should be
applied to evaluate a mother-child relationship.90 In Johnson v. Calvert, the court had
interpreted the UPA to provide “that ‘genetic consanguinity’ could be the basis for a
finding of maternity just as it is for paternity.”91 Therefore the genetic tie between KM
and the twins was evidence that KM was a parent under the California Family Code and
the UPA.92
In finding that KM was a legal parent, the court declined to apply § 7613(b).
California Family Code Section 7613(b), which expressly applies to sperm donors,
extinguishes the parental rights of donors who have donated genetic material. 93
Although the court agreed that § 7613(b) could apply to an egg donor, the court reasoned
that KM’s was not a “true egg donation situation.”94 Like the egg donor in Johnson, KM
was not a true donor because she had donated her eggs to produce a child that she would
help raise in her own home.95 Also, the court considered the statute’s legislative history96
and determined that § 7613(b) never was intended to apply to these facts.97 The court
also analogized KM to the sperm donor in In re R.C. who gave his sperm to impregnate
an unmarried female friend under the assumption that the resulting child would be his
own.98 The court agreed with the In re R.C. court in finding that the sperm donor
provision did not universally apply to donors who acted with the expectation of a future
parental relationship with the resulting child.99
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The court relied on the proposition that a child may have two parents, both of
whom are women. This rule was announced in Elisa B. v. Superior Court,100 a
companion case decided simultaneously with the K.M. v. E.G. decision. In Elisa B., the
court cited the California domestic partnership statutes, which vest both partners with the
same rights as spouses with respect to any child of either of them.101 Also, the court noted
that, in the adoption context, a child may have two female parents.102 Significantly, the
statement in Johnson, that a child could have only one natural mother, did not apply;
Johnson’s holding and reasoning were limited to the case where three different parties
claimed legal parentage.103
In K.M. v. E.G., the court similarly found the Johnson intent test inapplicable
because, unlike the women in Johnson, KM and EG’s claims were not mutually
exclusive.104 Specifically, the genetic mother in Johnson was found to be the legal parent
instead of the birth mother; here, KM claimed to be a legal parent in addition to EG.105
Because this was not a case where three people claim legal parenthood and “a tie” must
be broken between two, the court declined to apply the Johnson intent test. 106 The court
also pointed out that intent to parent generally is irrelevant outside the gestational
surrogacy context.107

C.

The two dissents

The two dissents, authored by Justices Kennard and Werdegar, offer a variety of
arguments designed to prevent KM, a parent in every sense aside from law, from being
found a legal parent. These arguments can be grouped into several broad categories.

11

First, the dissents both argued that the majority had misapplied the existing law.
The dissents viewed K.M. v. E.G. as misapplying the UPA because KM donated her eggs
in the same manner that, had she donated sperm under § 7613(b), would have severed her
parental rights.108 By declining to view KM as a donor, the dissents reason that the court
has treated an egg donor differently than sperm donors.109 Also, the dissents argued that
the court improperly applied a “best interest of the child” standard in deciding the case.110
Finally, the dissents argued that the Johnson intent test was governing law and should
have applied directly to this case, rather than creating a new test under which the court
evaluated the parties’ intent to participate in raising a child rather than the parties’ intent
to become legal parents.111
Second, both dissents voiced concerns about predictability and other parties’
reliance on the Johnson intent test. Specifically, Justice Kennard noted that “an unknown
number of Californians have made procreative choices in reliance on” the Johnson intent
test.112 In support of his claim, Justice Kennard cited the prebirth stipulated judgment in
the companion case of Kristine H. v. Lisa R.,113 where the parties had obtained a
judgment declaring the two women the “joint intended legal parents of the child born to
one of them.”114 However in Kristine H., another lesbian custody dispute, the court still
relied on the judgment to rule that the biological mother was estopped from contesting
her partner’s claim to parenthood.115 Justice Werdegar also cited the existence of other
gestational surrogacy agreements, noting that the parties had attempted to create certainty
at the time of conception and further observing that, at least in K.M. v. E.G., parenting
intent at conception was not dispositive.116
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Third, Judge Werdegar argued in his dissent that the majority’s rule
“inappropriately confers rights and imposes disabilities on person because of their sexual
orientation.”117 Justice Werdegar cited the majority’s use of the word “lesbian” several
times throughout its opinion and also cited the majority’s observation that it only could
announce the rule applicable to the facts of this case.118 Also, Justice Werdegar noted the
majority’s failure to clarify whether the same rule would apply had the parties not been
registered domestic partners.119
Fourth, Justice Werdegar offered several constitutional arguments. Because, in
his opinion, the case treats lesbians differently than others, Justice Werdegar opined the
rule announced in K.M. v. E.G. was subject to challenge under the Equal Protection
clause of the California constitution.120 Justice Werdegar also cited Troxel v. Granville121
for the proposition that granting any rights to others can only be done at the expense of
the legal parent’s right to make decisions concerning the child.122 Therefore, he argued,
the birth mother’s rights would necessarily be curtailed by a finding that another woman
also had parental rights, thus violating the substantive aspect of the Due Process clause of
the United States Constitution.123
III.

THE PROVISION OF RIGHTS TO A PARENT WHO IS BOTH A
GENETIC AND A BIOLOGICAL PARENT IS CONSISTANT WITH OUR
BASIC LEGAL AND CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING OF
PARENTHOOD.
Neither the rules surrounding sperm donation, nor the rules surrounding

surrogacy, nor the rules surrounding lesbian co-parenting are adequate to determine
whether KM, and others like her, are legal parents. Rather, we must return to
fundamental family law principles to answer the question of whether a woman who both
is the genetic parent of a child and has established a parent-child relationship with that
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child should be considered a “legal” or “natural” parent to that child. Moreover, the
analysis of a parentage claim made by one party need not include any consideration of
the other parent’s gender.
A.

The combination of genetic parentage and a parent-child relationship lead
to the conclusion that KM is a natural parent.

K.M. must be viewed as something more than an egg “donor.” A true donor gives
up genetic material, either eggs or sperm, in order that another person may become a
parent. However, a true donor does so with no interest in retaining parental rights or in
establishing a parent-child relationship with a resulting child. At the time of egg
donation, KM’s position might have been in some way analogous to that of the surrogate
in Johnson. The surrogate in Johnson had agreed to the surrogacy with no intent to
maintain a relationship with the child she produced.124 Similarly, KM did waive her legal
rights to her eggs when she donated them.125 Perhaps if KM had sought parental rights at
birth, the court might have viewed this case as a kind of “tie” between two mothers,
invoking the Johnson intent test. As in In re R.C., the court only would have examined
the parties’ initial intent because no subsequent evidence of parental relationship would
have been available. Until birth, a genetic mother who has not gestated her own child has
had no opportunity to form any relationship or bond with that child. In a true donor
situation, no such opportunity ever arises and no relationship ever forms between the
donor and the child. Further, if an intended parent seeks to prevent a donor from making
any claim to the child, then that parent never will allow any relationship to form between
a child and its genetic donor parent.
Once a parent-child relationship has formed between a genetic donor parent and
the child conceived of the donated material, an entirely different set of rules must apply.
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The child no longer is an infant, and the parties’ intent at conception no longer is the
overriding concern. Now the child has formed a parent-child bond with two parents, and
the dispute more closely resembles a lesbian custody case than a question of who ought
to be a legal parent to a newborn baby. In a case such as K.M. v. E.G., even the doctrines
under which lesbian custody cases are decided will be insufficient to resolve questions of
parentage. Although both parties are women, each has a legitimate physical tie to the
child. Each supplied a necessary component for conception, KM the eggs and EG the
uterus, and both women had a parent-child relationship with the child.126 Neither
parent’s claim is intrinsically superior, and the relational aspect of both parents’ claims
must be honored.
The significance of the parent-child relationship is clear if United States Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Lehr v. Robinson127 applies in the context of maternal rights and
gestational surrogacy. If, as Lehr suggests, a genetic tie plus the existence of a parentchild relationship create a parent, then a donor who subsequently acts as a parent may not
be denied legal parent status and protections. The Lehr Court relied on the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution in its analysis, ultimately concluding that a
biological father who lacked a parent-child relationship did not have constitutionallyprotected parental rights.128
Unfortunately, substantive Due Process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment
invoke far from a mechanical analysis. Indeed, the subsequent parentage case of Michael
H. v. Gerald D.,129 decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1989, demonstrates
vehement disagreement between the Justices as to the appropriate analysis of
unenumerated rights the substantive Due Process Clause of the United States
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Constitution. In Michael H., the Court upheld a statute that acted to deny parental rights
to a biological father based on a conclusive presumption of paternity in favor of the
mother’s husband.130 Writing for the plurality in Michael H., Justice Scalia presented a
narrow construction of the liberty interest in parentage.131 He reasoned that substantive
due process protections are not available to all parents, but rather protect only those types
of relationships that historically have received attention and protection.132 In a passionate
dissent, Justice Brennan questioned whether such specificity truly was the hallmark of
substantive due process analysis.133 Given the current state of the law and composition of
the Supreme Court, the ultimate resolution of the constitutional question presented in
K.M. v. E.G. is absolutely impossible to predict.
Although Lehr may not apply to a lesbian genetic parent’s claim to parentage
based on a narrow interpretation of the parent’s substantive due process rights, a parent
such as KM must not be denied rights to her child. A general understanding of our
Supreme Court precedent and our cultural values and norms still demand that a parent
who is a parent both genetically and relationally, ultimately in every sense but law, ought
not to be denied legal parentage and legal rights to that parent’s own child. Any other
outcome would be a denial of rights to a parent who, but for the unusual circumstances
created by advances in assisted reproduction technology, would have had unquestionable
parental rights. Our legal system has not kept pace with technology in this area, and our
family law structure may not have entirely kept pace with social change and alternative
families.134 But denying parentage to parents such as KM convolutes our understanding
of what it means to be a parent, and calls into question the general claim that biology plus
a parent-child relationship creates a family.
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B.

Natural parents such as KM ought not to be forced to rely on alternative
means for acquiring rights in their own children.135

In establishing her parental rights, KM should not have to rely on adoption laws.
Second parent adoption is one way in which non-legal lesbian partners have assured
themselves of parental rights and have created future security of the children whom they
are raising.136 Adoption by a mother’s lesbian partner is not, however, permissible in
every jurisdiction.137 Also, adoption requires the existing parent’s permission,138 and
EG’s failure to allow an adoption in K.M. v. E.G. was one of the underlying controversies
between the parties.139 Rather, KM’s parental rights should be the product of genetics
plus a parent-child relationship, arising independently of EG’s consent to a legal
proceeding. An adoption proceeding would be wholly unnecessary and superfluous to
secure a genetic mother’s rights in such cases.
Alternate theories of parenting, such as de facto or functional parenting, also
should not be the basis of KM’s parental rights. Some courts, after recognizing the
changing shape of the modern family, have resorted to such legal fictions to vest parental
rights in an individual who had no tie to a child at conception.140 Although these
doctrines have been helpful in granting some lesbians parental rights in some
circumstances, they also are not available in all jurisdictions.141 Furthermore, doctrines
such as de facto parenting begin with the assumption that the individual is not a “natural”
parent to the child;142 in other words, these theories begin with the assumption that the
individual and the child have no biological or gestational tie and that there are no
presumptions in play that would provide a more direct route to parental rights. However,
in the case of KM, she is a genetic mother without whom the children would not exist at
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all. KM cannot properly be considered a legal stranger to a resulting child, and these
doctrines begin with the premise that the individual is a legal stranger.
C.

Reshaping the analysis of parentage claims: a proposed change to the
UPA.

The structure of the UPA remains tied to two historical family norms: that every
“natural” family has two “natural” parents, and those two parents include one man and
one woman.143 Yet the validity of KM’s claim to parentage can be tested and confirmed
without any reference to the gender of the twins’ other parent. Indeed, the entire analysis
of KM’s rights is independent of the possible rights of any other legal parent, regardless
of whether that analysis is made under the United States Constitution or, more loosely,
under the basic understanding that a parent is made through a (usually genetic)
involvement in conception plus the existence of a parent-child relationship. If, as the
court in K.M. v. E.G. observed, KM’s rights arose concurrently with the gestational
mother’s rights,144 then EG’s gender is entirely irrelevant to the parentage inquiry.
Therefore, where only two legal parents exist,145 each party’s parental rights ought to be
tested without reference to the gender of the other party. This approach eliminates
gender biases inherent in our family law scheme while also responding to the changing
shape of the modern family.

IV.

STRIPPING GENDER FROM THE PARENTAGE ANALYSIS WILL
CHANGE THE DIALOGUE AND PROTECT ALL PARENTS.
In gestational surrogacy cases where only two parents claim parental rights, the

parentage claims of each party ought to be evaluated without consideration of the gender
of the other party and, ideally, without consideration of the other party’s claim at all. By
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eliminating gender from the dialogue entirely, the K.M. v. E.G. court’s assumption that a
child may have two mothers is not a legal prerequisite to a grant of rights. Also, the
arguments presented by the K.M. v. E.G. dissents are of less weight when the analysis is
altered. Moreover, such a change in dialogue will avoid additional barriers to parentage
that might be presented through the case law of other jurisdictions.
A.

Evaluating parentage claims without reference to a parent’s gender avoids
reliance on the assumption that a child can have two parents of the same
gender.

Although California now provides that a child can have two parents, both of
whom are women, this is not the law in all jurisdictions. If another jurisdiction seeks to
follow the analysis and outcome in K.M. v. E.G., that jurisdiction must expressly accept
the proposition that a child may have two parents of the same gender. However, if each
prospective parent’s rights were evaluated without respect to gender, then no such
assumption is necessary. By changing the dialogue, the court may effectively allow a
child to have two female parents while not expressly relying on the normative assumption
that a family with two female parents is “natural” to support an award of parental rights.
Thus, where two parents both claim rights in addition to each other, each parent’s claim
may stand or fall without any intrinsic gender bias present in the analysis. Parents in
non-traditional families like KM and EG’s family will be assured of rights, but courts
will not even have to address a proposition with which some courts are very
uncomfortable: the notion that a “natural” family need not consist of a man and a woman.
Avoidance of the gender dialogue can be criticized as a compromise between alternative
families and a conservative legal system. However, in reality the change actually is an
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evolution, changing the focus from an outdated model of the “natural” family to a more
realistic consideration of individual rights and each person’s liberty interest in parentage.
Also, by changing the dialogue, the courts no longer will be bound by the
heterosexual legal regime that is our family law when deciding parentage questions in the
gestational surrogacy context. Instead, potential parents’ rights arise by virtue of the
connections between that party and the child, and need not be affected by the gender of
the other person. Elimination of gender as the basis of a core assumption allows the
courts to recognize each “natural” parent’s rights. In this manner, lesbian parents’ rights
will be honored if they meet the same criteria as other parents. Lesbian parents will
receive parental rights if they have a genetic, biological, or presumptive parental status
plus a parent-child relationship with the child. This rule in no way treats lesbians or
women different from others. Instead, it will consistently honor the three relevant factors
involved in parentage decisions: genetics and biology, relationships, and presumptions.
B.

By removing gender from the dialogue altogether, the concerns voiced by
the dissents are further eroded.

The dissents offered four key arguments to deny rights to KM, yet each of these
arguments fails if each party’s parentage claim is evaluated independently and without
reference to the other party’s gender. First, the dissents argued that the KM
court
misapplied existing law. Certainly the statute that the majority rejects and the dissent
cites is open to multiple interpretations. Yet if each parent’s claim is evaluated
individually, the result will always honor the core parentage considerations that are
present in all areas of family law. K.M., for example, demonstrates evidence of
parenthood by virtue of her genetic tie to the child. Although she may have waived rights
to the eggs before conception, applicable law here is not limited to the sperm donor
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statute that the dissents would apply. Courts historically have considered the subsequent
development of a parent-child relationship in resolving more common questions of
parentage. Further, as the K.M. v. E.G. court points out, intent at conception generally is
not relevant to parentage determinations that occur years later. The dissent’s first
argument is circumvented by the changed dialogue, which invokes different legal rules.
KM may be a natural parent under these rules, and the consequence that the children have
two female parents is irrelevant to protecting KM’s rights.
Second, the dissents argue that other parties have relied on the Johnson intent test.
However, a party’s reliance on an incorrect and discriminatory legal test, which
improperly considers the gender of one parent to determine the rights of the other, does
not justify maintenance of that legal test. Each party’s parental rights are the primary
concern and focus of the parentage inquiry. Even where other parties are affected by a
change in the law or the analysis to be applied, the only impact will be to vest legal
parentage in individuals who otherwise are parents notwithstanding their non-traditional
families. Changing the dialogue, while it may affect other families created by gestational
surrogacy, will ensure the correct result in future cases.
Third, Justice Werdegar argued that the K.M. v. E.G. holding was inherently
incorrect because it involved a consideration of the parties’ gender and sexual orientation.
This claim is incorrect for two reasons. First, the facts of this case are rather unique and
call for a unique resolution. Women play two roles in creating a child: the genetic
contribution and the fetal gestation. Through a gestational surrogacy, only women, and
not men, can share biological responsibility for a child at birth. Second, because a
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parent-child relationship usually only arises within a family setting, it is unlikely that this
type of dispute would arise outside of the context of a lesbian family.
Regardless, the omission of gender from the parentage dialogue eliminates Justice
Werdegar’s concern entirely. Where gender is not even discussed, it certainly cannot be
the basis for uneven application of the law. This same analysis applies to the dissent’s
constitutional argument based on Troxel. Troxel involved a parent and a third party, not
two individuals with claims of parental rights. Each of two individuals with claims to
parenthood, if each claim is valid, may have parental rights to the child that are different
in kind from the rights of third parties. Conversely, to consider gender in the parentage
decision is to suggest that one claim of parental rights is more valid than the other. Our
family law is based on the notion that parents’ rights are equally valid.
C.

Changing the dialogue also avoids arguments that could arise from the law
in other jurisdictions.

Two additional arguments that can be made to deny a second woman parental
rights in her child concern, first, standing and, second, the notion that parental
relationships and rights ought not to be honored in jurisdictions where state constitutional
amendments prohibit marriage between same-sex couples.
The first argument against granting parental rights to women in the same position
as KM is that the lesbian partner of a child’s natural mother does not have standing to
seek legal parentage under the UPA.146 Although “any interested person” may seek legal
parentage under the UPA, lack of standing was the basis on which the trial court initially
dismissed KM’s petition.147 However, as the appellate court recognized, KM’s genetic
tie provides an independent basis for her to claim standing to seek parentage.148 By
changing the dialogue to focus only on the nature of KM’s claim to parentage, without
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reference to a child’s other parent, no court can validly deny standing. Any party who
has a biological parental relationship to a child ought to have standing to seek parentage.
The fact that a child already has a “natural” mother is irrelevant to KM’s claim and, if her
claim is evaluated without reference to another “natural” mother, then no standing
argument will be cogent.
The second argument that could be used to deny parental rights to lesbian parents
such as KM is that, in states where same-sex unions are not legally recognized, no
parentage decisions can legitimize that union. In Ohio, for example, one lesbian seeking
to invalidate a custody order has argued that the order has been invalidated by such a
constitutional amendment.149 However, if each parent’s rights are the primary concern
and are to be determined without reference to the gender of the other party, then even
states with constitutional amendments will maintain the proper focus. Courts will look at
each parent alone to determine rights, and no legal recognition of any relationship
between the parents is necessary. Avoiding the gender dialogue thus will assure every
parent of rights even in states that most rigidly would reject the assumption that a child
can have two legal parents. Instead, parents’ rights must be protected, regardless of
whether or not the resulting family has two mothers.
V.

Conclusion
As the face of the modern family changes and as new reproductive options alter

our traditional notions of who are “natural” parents, the courts have been faced with new
parentage questions that cannot be resolved by the traditional gender-based family law
model. K.M. v. E.G. is one example of such a parentage claim; in K.M. v. E.G., two
women had both genetic/biological ties to the children and parent-child relationships with
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the children. Thus, both women could assert parentage claims over the twins. Based on
basic family law principles that instruct that biology plus relationship makes a parent,
both women are parents. Further, the assumption that a child may have two mothers is
unnecessary in protecting the parental rights of both parents. Instead, courts must
evaluate both parties’ parentage claims without regard to the other party’s gender. If
gender is eliminated from the dialogue, then courts will more uniformly protect parental
rights in cases outside the “natural” family, ultimately protecting all families regardless
of the parents’ gender.
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